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Abstract
We consider the problem of selling perishable items to a stream of buyers in order to maximize
social welfare. A seller starts with a set of identical items, and each arriving buyer wants any
one item, and has a valuation drawn i.i.d. from a known distribution. Each item, however,
disappears after an a priori unknown amount of time that we term the horizon for that item.
The seller knows the (possibly different) distribution of the horizon for each item, but not its
realization till the item actually disappears. As with the classic prophet inequalities, the goal is
to design an online pricing scheme that competes with the prophet that knows the horizon and
extracts full social surplus (or welfare).
Our main results are for the setting where items have independent horizon distributions sat-
isfying the monotone-hazard-rate (MHR) condition. Here, for any number of items, we achieve
a constant-competitive bound via a conceptually simple policy that balances the rate at which
buyers are accepted with the rate at which items are removed from the system. We implement
this policy via a novel technique of matching via probabilistically simulating departures of the
items at future times. Moreover, for a single item and MHR horizon distribution with mean
µ, we show a tight result: There is a fixed pricing scheme that has competitive ratio at most
2− 1/µ, and this is the best achievable in this class.
We further show that our results are best possible. First, we show that the competitive ratio
is unbounded without the MHR assumption even for one item. Further, even when the horizon
distributions are i.i.d. MHR and the number of items becomes large, the competitive ratio of
any policy is lower bounded by a constant greater than 1, which is in sharp contrast to the
setting with identical deterministic horizons.
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1 Introduction
Online posted pricing problems are one of the canonical examples in online decision-making and
optimal control. The basic model comprises of a fixed supply of non-replenishable items; buy-
ers (demand) arrive in an online fashion over a fixed time interval, and the platform sets prices
to maximize some objective such as social surplus (welfare) or revenue. Another variant of this
setting is found in internet advertising, where the number of advertisements (supply) is assumed
to be fixed (for example, based on contracts between the publisher and advertisers), while key-
words/impressions (demand) arrive online, and are matched to ads via some policy. The demand
is typically assumed to obey some underlying random process, which allows the problem to be cast
as a Markov Decision Process (MDP); however, in many settings, such a formulation suffers from a
“curse of dimensionality”, making it infeasible to solve optimally.
An important idea for circumventing the computational intractability of optimal pricing is that of
prophet inequalities — heuristics with performance guarantees with respect to the optimal policy in
hindsight (i.e., the performance of a prophet with full information of future arrivals). The simplest
prophet inequality has its origins in the statistics community [23] — given a single item and T
arriving buyers with values drawn from known distributions, there is a pricing scheme using only
a single price that extracts at least half the social surplus earned by the prophet (moreover, this
is tight). More recently, there has been a long line of work generalizing this setting to incorporate
multiple (possibly non-identical) items, as well as combinatorial buyer valuations [17, 6, 22, 13, 10,
25, 9, 1, 11].
The aim of our work is to develop a theory of prophet inequalities for settings with uncertainty in
future supply. This is a natural extension of the basic posted-price setting, and indeed special cases
of our framework have been considered before [27, 17] (in the context of optimal secretary problems
with a random “freeze” on hiring). What makes these problems of greater relevance today is the
rise of online ‘sharing economy’ marketplaces, such as those for transportation (Lyft, Uber), labor
(Taskrabbit, Upwork), lodging (Airbnb), medical services (PlushCare), etc. The novelty in such
marketplaces arises because of their two-sided nature: in addition to buyers who arrive online, the
supply is now controlled by “sellers” who can arrive and depart in an online fashion. For example,
in the case of ridesharing/lodging platforms, the units of supply (empty vehicles/vacant listings)
arrive over time, and have some patience interval after which they abandon the system (get matched
to rides on other platforms/remove their listings). Supply uncertainty also arises in other settings,
for instance, if items are perishable and last for a priori random amounts of time. Our work aims
to understand the design of pricing policies for such settings, and characterize how the resulting
prophet inequalities depend on the characteristics of the supply uncertainty.
1.1 Model
We introduce “supply uncertainty” into the basic prophet inequality setting as follows: There are m
items present initially, but these do not last till the end of the buyer arrivals, but instead, depart
after an a priori unknown amount of time. Formally, we assume each item i samples a horizon from
a distribution Hi, at which time it departs. We assume the horizon lengths for items are mutually
independent, and also independent of the valuation distribution of the buyers. Note though that
the items can have different horizon distributions. We denote the maximum possible horizon length
for any item as n.
On the demand side, we assume there is an infinite stream of unit-demand buyers arriving
online, where the valuation of the h-th arriving buyer is a random variable Xh drawn i.i.d. from
a distribution V . From the perspective of a buyer, all items are interchangeable, and hence being
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matched to any item that has not yet departed yields value Xh. Note that assuming an infinite
stream of buyers is without loss of generality, because we can encode any upper bound on the
number of buyers in the horizon distributions.
The algorithm designer knows the horizon distribution Hi for each item, and the buyer value
distribution V , but not the realized horizons for each item (until the item actually departs), or the
value for any buyer. The goal is to design an online pricing scheme that competes with a prophet
that knows the realized horizons of each item and the valuation sequence of buyers, and extracts
full social surplus (or welfare).
The main outcome of the standard prophet inequality is that there are constant-competitive
algorithms for maximizing welfare, even when buyers are heterogeneous and arrive in arbitrary
order. This however turns out to be impossible in the presence of item horizons without additional
assumptions. First, even with i.i.d. horizons, achieving a constant factor turns out to be impossible
for general horizon distributions (cf. Theorem 4); thus to make progress, we need more structure
on the horizons. One natural assumption is that each item is more and more likely to depart as
time goes on, which can be formalized as follows.
Definition 1. A horizon distribution H satisfies the monotone-hazard-rate (MHR) condition if:
Pr
h∼H
[h ≥ h∗ + 2 | h ≥ h∗ + 1] ≤ Pr
h∼H
[h ≥ h∗ + 1 | h ≥ h∗], ∀h∗ ≥ 1.
Several distributions satisfy the MHR condition, including uniform, geometric, deterministic,
and Poisson; note also that truncating an MHR distribution preserves the condition.
Finally, even with MHR horizons, buyer heterogeneity is a barrier for obtaining a constant-
competitive algorithm, as demonstrated by the following example, with deterministic valuations
and known order of arrivals.
Example 1. Given m = 1 item with horizon following a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5,
consider a sequence of n buyers with vh = 2
h for h = 1, 2, . . . , n. The expected value of the prophet
is Θ(n) while any algorithm can only achieve a constant value in expectation.
1.2 Main Result: Prophet Inequalities under Uncertain Supply
The above discussion motivates us to study settings with i.i.d. buyers, and items with MHR hori-
zons. Our main result is that these two assumptions are sufficient to obtain a constant-competitive
approximation to the prophet welfare. In particular, our main technical result is the following theo-
rem, which we prove in Section 2.
Theorem 1. There is a constant-competitive online policy for social surplus for any m ≥ 1 items
with independent and possibly non-identical MHR horizon distributions, and unit-demand buyers
arriving with i.i.d. valuations.
Though the complete algorithm is somewhat involved, at a high level, it is based on a simple
underlying idea: to be constant-competitive against the prophet, we need to choose prices so as to
balance the rate of matches and departures. Achieving this in the general case is non-trivial, and
requires some new technical ideas. However, for the special case of a single item, balancing can be
achieved via a simple fixed pricing scheme. In Section 3, we use this to obtain the following tight
result for the m = 1 setting (this also serves as a primitive for our overall algorithm):
Theorem 2. There is a fixed pricing scheme for a single item with an MHR horizon distribution
with mean µ that has competitive ratio 2−1/µ. Further, this bound is tight for the geometric horizon
distribution with mean µ.
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Intuitively, the factor of two in the above theorem corresponds to the prophet considering match-
ing and departures as the same, which an algorithm cannot do. The surprising aspect is that this
simple policy is worst-case optimal within the class of instances with MHR horizons — this is in
contrast to deterministic horizons, where fixed pricing is known to be suboptimal for the special
case of one item with known (deterministic) horizon and i.i.d. buyers [18, 11].
1.3 Lower Bounds
We complement our positive results by showing several lower bounds that establish their tightness.
As mentioned above, in Section 3, we show a (tight) lower bound of 2− 1/µ for m = 1 items with
MHR horizons. Our main lower bounds in Section 4 generalizes this to m ≥ 1 items.
Theorem 3. For the multi-item setting with i.i.d. geometric horizons:
• For any number of items, there is a lower bound of 1.57 on the competitive ratio of any dynamic
pricing scheme; in the limit when the number of items goes to infinity, this improves to 2.
• No fixed pricing scheme can be o(log logm)-competitive where m is the number of items.
The above theorem implies that the MHR horizon setting, even with i.i.d. horizons, is signifi-
cantly different from the setting with multiple items and a single deterministic horizon (where fixed
pricing extracts
(
1−O
(
1√
m
))
-fraction of surplus [2]). Put differently, the lower bound empha-
sizes that even with i.i.d. horizons, to obtain a constant-competitive algorithm, it is not sufficient
to replace the horizon distributions by their expectations and use standard prophet inequalities —
the stochastic nature of the horizons allows for significant deviations in the order of departures of
the items, and a policy that knows this ordering can potentially extract much more welfare. Given
this, it is quite surprising that a simple dynamic pricing scheme achieves a constant approximation.
Finally, we consider the general case where there is no restriction on the horizon distribution.
In this setting, the presence of supply uncertainty severely limits the performance of any non-
anticipatory dynamic pricing scheme in comparison to the omniscient prophet. In particular, we
show that for any number of items and i.i.d. buyer valuations, the ratio between the welfare of
any algorithm and the prophet grows with the horizon, even if the algorithm knows the realized
valuations.
Theorem 4. For any m ≥ 1 items, there exists a family of instances such that the prophet has
welfare Ω
(
logn
log logn
)
-factor larger than any online policy, even if the policy knows all the realized
values, but not the realized horizons. Here, n = maxi{supp(Hi)}.
This generalizes similar lower bounds for settings where the horizon is unknown [19, 17]. The
proof of this result is provided in Appendix A.1.
1.4 Technical Highlights
At a high level, we achieve our results via a conceptually simple and natural class of balancing
policies that generalizes policies for the deterministic-horizon case:
Balancing Policy. Balance the rate at which buyers are accepted to the rate at which
items depart the system because their horizon is reached.
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Converting this high-level description of balancing into a concrete policy requires new technical
ideas. We first note the technical challenges we encounter. In the setting with deterministic identical
horizons [23, 13], we can achieve constant-competitive algorithms (or even better) via a global
expected value relaxation that yields a fixed pricing scheme. Indeed, such an argument can safely
assume buyers are non-identical with adversarial arrival order. However, the setting with stochastic
horizons is very different. First, as Example 1 shows, even for m = 1 item with geometric horizon,
there is an Ω(n) lower bound when buyer valuations are not identically distributed. Secondly, for
m > 1 items, we need dynamic pricing even in the simplest settings — when horizons are i.i.d.
geometric (see Theorem 3), or when they are deterministic. This precludes the use of a global
one-shot analysis.
At this point, we could try using techniques from stochastic optimization, particularly stochastic
matchings [7, 5] and multi-armed bandits [14, 16]. Here, the idea is to come up with a weakly coupled
relaxation, say one policy per item, and devise a feasible policy by combining these. However, these
algorithms crucially require the state of the system to only change via policy actions, and our
problem more is similar to a restless bandit problem [15] where item departures cause the state of
the system can change regardless of policy actions taken. Indeed, the actual departure process itself
may significantly deviate from its expected values, making it non-trivial to use a global relaxation.
Simulating Departures. This brings up our technical highlight: Instead of encoding the depar-
ture process in a fine-grained way into a relaxation, we simulate its behavior in our final policy.
In more detail, we first write a weak relaxation of the prophet’s welfare separately in a sequence
of stages with geometrically decreasing number of items. This only uses the expected number of
items that survive in the stage, and not the identity of these items. The advantage of such a weak
relaxation is that it yields a solution with nice structure: this policy non-adaptively sets a fixed
price in each stage to balance the departure rate with the rate of matches. However, it is non-trivial
to construct a feasible policy from this relaxation, since the relaxation decouples the allocations of
the prophet across different stages, while any feasible algorithm’s allocations are clearly coupled.
Indeed, the optimal feasible policy is the solution to a dynamic program with state space exponential
in m, and the prophet is further advantaged by knowing which items depart earlier in the future.
Surprisingly, we show that our simple relaxation is still enough to achieve a constant-competitive
algorithm. We do so by simulating the departure process, that is, by choosing items for matching
with the same probability that they would have departed at a future point in time. This couples
the stochastic process that dictates the number of items available in the policy with that in the
prophet’s upper bound, albeit with a constant-factor speedup in time. This yields a non-adaptive
policy that makes its pricing decisions for the entire horizon, as well as the (randomized) sequence
in which to sell the items, in advance. We believe such a policy construction that simulates the
evolution of state of the system may find further applications in the analysis of restless MDPs.
Lower Bounds from Time-Reversal. Our lower bounds are all based on demonstrating partic-
ular bad settings as in Example 1. From a technical perspective, the most interesting construction
is that in Theorem 3 — here, we first consider a canonical, asymptotic regime where the horizon
distribution is geometric with mean approaching infinity, and show that we can closely approximate
the behavior of the prophet and the algorithm via an appropriate Markov chain. We then define
and analyze a novel time-reversed Markov chain encoding the prophet’s behavior, that captures
matching a departing item to the optimal buyer that arrived previously.
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1.5 Related Work
The first prophet inequalities are due to Krengel and Sucheston [23, 24]. It was subsequently
shown [26], there is a 2-competitive fixed pricing scheme that is oblivious to the order in which the
buyers arrive, and this ratio is tight in the worst case over the arrival order. Motivated by applica-
tions to online auctions, since then there have been several extensions to multiple items [20, 17, 2],
matching setting [3, 28], matroid constraints [22] and general combinatorial valuation functions [13,
25].
Our work is a generalization of the single-item setting where buyer valuations are i.i.d. and the
horizon is known, to the case where the horizon is stochastic and there are multiple items. The
setting with known horizons was first considered in Hill and Kertz [18]. In this case, the optimal
pricing scheme can be computed by a dynamic program, and a sequence of results [21, 1, 9] show a
tight competitive ratio of 1.342 for this dynamic program against the prophet. In contrast, we show
that when the horizon is MHR, a simple fixed pricing scheme has optimal competitive ratio of 2.
A generalization of the i.i.d. setting is the recently-introduced prophet secretary problem where
the buyers are not identical, but the order of arrival is a random permutation. In this case, fixed
pricing is a tight ee−1 -approximation [12, 11]; and a dynamic pricing scheme can beat this bound [4, 8]
by a slight amount. Though our results extend to this setting, it is not the focus of our paper since
the i.i.d.-valuations case is sufficient to bring out our conceptual message.
The random horizon setting has been extensively studied in the context of the classic secretary
problem. When the horizon is unknown (that is, no distributional information at all), no constant-
competitive algorithm is possible [19]. In the context of prophet inequalities, the unknown-horizon
setting was considered by Hajiaghayi et al. [17], who show again that no constant-competitive
algorithm is possible. We use a similar example to extend this lower bound to the case where the
horizon is stochastic from a known distribution.
2 Prophet Inequality for Heterogeneous Items with MHR Horizons
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 1. We first give an overview of our algorithm. At a
high level, this scheme attempts to balance the rate that items are assigned to buyers and the rate
that items naturally depart. In Section 2.1, we first introduce a way to divide the entire time horizon
into disjoint stages in a way such that during the k-th stage, m
2k
items depart in expectation. We
then bound the prophet’s welfare separately for each stage (Section 2.2) — we do so via a relaxation
that ignores the identity of the items, and only captures the constraint that the expected number of
matches in a stage is at most the expected number of items present at the beginning of that stage.
The key technical hurdle at this point is that when we make a matching, we do so without
knowing exactly when items depart in the future. This changes the distribution of the items available
in subsequent stages. To get around this, in each stage, we first simulate the future departure of
items, and use this to select items available for matching in the current stage. In more detail, in
Section 2.3, we split the stages alternately into even and odd stages, and develop an algorithm whose
welfare approximates the welfare of the relaxed prophet from the odd stages (and by symmetry,
another algorithm that approximates the welfare from the even stages).
For approximating the welfare from the odd stages, the algorithm re-divides time into a new set
of stages corresponding to the odd stages under the old division (See Figure 1). We then use each
new stage to approximate the welfare generated in the corresponding odd stage in the old division;
to do so, we sample candidate items for matching in the current stage with the probability they
would leave in the subsequent even stage under the old division. Consequently, for every item, the
probability of departure during an even stage under the old division is the same as of being selected
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for matching in the current stage. We show that this process couples the behavior of the algorithm
and the benchmark, assuming the departure processes are MHR. Using concentration bounds, we
show that this approach yields a constant approximation.
In addition to the above process, our algorithm needs to separately handle any stage of length
1 (i.e., any single time period where the expected number of available items reduces by at least
half), as well as a final stage where the expected number of available items is constant. We show
that the welfare in the length 1 phases is approximated by a blind matching algorithm which
matches all incoming buyers (Section 2.4), while the welfare of the final period is approximated
by an algorithm that randomly selects only one item for matching at the beginning, and discards
the rest (Section 2.5). For the latter setting (i.e., for a single item setting), we present a tight
2-competitive fixed pricing scheme for the m = 1 setting in Section 3. Finally, the overall algorithm
is based on randomly choosing one of the four candidate algorithms (i.e., for approximating the
prophet welfare in odd stages, even stages, short stages, and the final stage), with an appropriately
chosen distribution.
2.1 Splitting Time into Stages
As a first step, we divide the time horizon into s + 1 stages. The k-th stage corresponds to an
interval [ℓk, rk). For k = 1, 2, . . . , s, we define rk by
rk:= min
{
t+1 : E[number of remaining items after time t] ≤ m
2k
}
.
Also ℓk+1 := rk for k = 1, 2, . . . , s; ℓ1 = 1 and rs+1 =∞.
We set s to be the smallest non-negative integer so that m2s ≤ 10, i.e., s := max
(
0,
⌈
log2
m
10
⌉)
.
Within the first s stages, we separate stages of length rk− ℓk = 1 from the rest. We term the stages
of length at least 2 as Long stages, and those of length 1 as Short stages. We term the stage
s+ 1 as the Final stage. Note that based on our choice of s, the expected number of items which
remain in the final stage is at most 10, and unless s = 0, at least 5 items in expectation survive at
one time step earlier into the final stage.
2.2 Upper Bound on Prophet’s Welfare
In this section, we develop a tractable upper bound for the prophet. Let Pro denote the optimal
welfare obtainable by the prophet. We term the total welfare of Pro in the Long stages as
ProLong, the total welfare in the Short stages as ProShort, and the welfare in the Final stage
as ProFinal. Clearly, we have:
Lemma 1. Pro = ProLong + ProShort + ProFinal.
We bound ProLong and ProShort separately for each stage. Let Prok denote the welfare
from stage k, so that ProLong + ProShort =
∑s
k=1 Prok.
Lemma 2. For 1 ≤ k ≤ s, we have:
Prok ≤ min
(
rk − ℓk, m
2k−1
)
· E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ pk],
where pk satisfies Prv∼V [v ≥ pk] = min
(
1, m/2
k−1
rk−ℓk
)
.1
1The existence of such p is without loss of generality: Let t = min
(
1, m/2
k−1
rk−ℓk
)
. When there exists some p∗ such
that Pr[v ≥ p∗] > t and Pr[v > p∗] < t, we could accept all values greater than p∗ and accept p∗ with probability
t−Pr[v>p∗]
Pr[v=p∗]
.
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Proof. Fix a stage k. Let Wi be the expected welfare that the prophet gets from buyer i, and let yi
be the probability that buyer i is matched by the prophet (ℓk ≤ i < rk).
Notice that in expectation, at most m
2k−1 items have horizons of at least ℓk by the definition of
stages. Therefore,
∑rk
i=ℓk
yi ≤ m2k−1 .
Let FV be the CDF of the distribution V . We have Wi ≤ yi ·Ev∼V
[
v
∣∣ v ≥ F−1V (1− yi)], since
when buyer i is matched with probability yi, the prophet cannot do better than getting the top
yi-percentile of the distribution V from the buyer. With these constraints, we write a relaxation for
the welfare of the prophet during stage k:
max
rk−1∑
i=ℓk
Wi
s.t. Wi ≤ yi · E
v∼V
[
v
∣∣ v ≥ F−1V (1− yi)] , ∀i=ℓk, ℓk+1, . . . , rk−1,
rk−1∑
i=ℓk
yi ≤ m
2k−1
,
yi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i=ℓk, ℓk+1, . . . , rk−1.
Clearly yi’s should be equal in the optimal solution. Therefore,
rk−1∑
i=ℓk
Wi ≤ (rk − ℓk) ·min
(
1,
m/2k−1
rk − ℓk
)
· E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ pk],
where Prv∼V [v ≥ pk] = min
(
1, m/2
k−1
rk−ℓk
)
. Summing over the s stages finishes the proof.
Notice that in our upper bound for
∑s
k=1 Prok, if an item departs during stage k, we allow
it to be matched once in stage 1, once in stage 2, . . . , and once in stage k. However, since the
expected number of departures in each stage exponentially decreases, only a constant factor is lost
comparing with the finer relaxation where we enforce the constraint that each item is only matched
once across the stages. Our coarser relaxation enables a cleaner benchmark to work on.
We next bound ProFinal. Let ProSinglei be the optimal welfare of the prophet (from all
stages) if item i is the only item available in the system, i.e., the single-item setting. We consider
this setting in detail in Section 3.
Lemma 3. ProFinal ≤∑mi=1Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1] ·ProSinglei.
Proof. Let Wi be the welfare that the prophet can get from item i during the final stage. We have
Wi ≤ Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi reaches the final stage]·
E
hi∼Hi
[welfare from item i in the final stage | hi reaches the final stage]
≤ Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi reaches the final stage] · E[welfare from item i]
= Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ ℓs+1] ·ProSinglei,
where the second inequality comes from the MHR condition of Hi: Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1 + k | hi ≥
ℓs+1− 1+ k] ≤ Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ 1+ k | hi ≥ k] — item i would depart faster if it started at time ℓs+1.
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Summing up the items, we have:
ProFinal ≤
m∑
i=1
Wi ≤
m∑
i=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ ℓs+1] ·ProSinglei.
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 together give an upper bound for our benchmark as:
Pro ≤

 ∑
k≤s, rk−ℓk>1
Prok

+

 ∑
k≤s, rk−ℓk=1
Prok

+
[
m∑
i=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ ℓs+1] ·ProSinglei
]
where the three term correspond to an upper bound on the prophet’s welfare in the Long, Short
and Final stages respectively (i.e., ProLong, ProShort, and ProFinal). In the next three
sections, we describe three separate algorithms, each one of which, if run independently, provides
an approximation to one of the terms. Our overall algorithm is then based on randomly choosing
between the three algorithms with appropriately chosen distribution.
2.3 Approximating ProLong: The DepartureSimulation Algorithm
We first approximate upper bound given in Lemma 2. Within this, we approximate ProLong and
ProShort separately. We first focus on ProLong, since this is technically the most interesting,
and postpone approximating ProShort to Section 2.4.
OLD: · · ·
NEW: · · ·
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
S′1 S
′
3 S
′
5
Figure 1: Redivision of the Time Horizon
We approximate ProLong by Algorithm 1. We divide all the s stages into alternate odd and
even stages. We focus on illustrating the approximation for odd stages, and that for even stages is
identical. We then re-divide time into stages corresponding to the original odd stages, as illustrated
in Figure 1, where Sk stands for the old stage k and S
′
k stands for the new stage k. At each odd
stage, we sample items according to their departure rates during the next (fictitious) even stage.
During the new process when items become unavailable by being sampled, each item is as least as
likely to survive a stage as before, since the sampling is only as frequent as the natural departures
during the original even stages.
Note that we set each S′k to be 1 time step shorter than the corresponding Sk and make each
fictitious even stage 1 time step longer (unless the length of Sk is 0). We do this to ensure enough
items will be sampled: Because of integrality constraints, an even stage may be too short (e.g., of
length 0) and if so, little (or nothing if the stage has length 0) can be sampled there. This is also
the reason why Short stages are separately considered.
Note that Algorithm 1 can be easily modified to work with even stages instead of odd stages,
and will yield the corresponding version of the theorem below with “odd” replaced by “even”. In
order to show Theorem 1, we will use either the odd stages or even stages algorithm depending on
which yields larger expected welfare. Note that it is entirely possible that one of these stages yields
very low welfare compared to the other.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 is a 15.1-approximation to the sum of Prok over odd stages k ≤ s with
rk − ℓk ≥ 2.
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Algorithm 1: DepartureSimulation: Odd Stages Version
1 A← {1, 2, . . . ,m} // A = Set of available items
2 for each odd stage k = 1, 3, . . . , till stage s do
3 Ck ← ∅ // Ck = Set of items considered in this stage
4 For each i ∈ A, with probability Prhi∼Hi [hi < rk+1 | hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1], place in Ck
5 A← A \ Ck
6 if rk − ℓk ≥ 2 then
7 pk ← F−1V
(
max
(
0, 1− m/2k−1rk−ℓk
))
8 For each of the next rk − ℓk − 1 arriving buyers, if this buyer has valuation ≥ pk,
match to any item in Ck and remove this item from Ck
9 If any item departs, remove it from A and Ck
Proof. We use y+ to denote max(0, y). For any odd k with rk− ℓk ≥ 2, let the random variable Mk
be the number of items in the set Ck that has horizon of at least
∑(k+1)/2
k′=1 (r2k′−1 − ℓ2k′−1 − 1)+,
i.e., the end of (new) stage k. We denote
∑j
k′=1(r2k′−1− ℓ2k′−1− 1)+ by Sj in the rest of the proof.
Mk is the sum of m independent Bernoulli random variables, where the i-th one denotes whether
item i is in Ck and has horizon of at least S(k+1)/2. We have
E[Mk] =
m∑
i=1
Pr
[
item i is in Ck and has horizon of at least S(k+1)/2
]
=
m∑
i=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[
hi ≥ S(k+1)/2
] ·

(k−1)/2∏
j=1
(
1− Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi < r2j | hi ≥ ℓ2j − 1]
) ·
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi < rk+1 | hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1],
where we calculate the probability that item i has horizon of at least
∑(k+1)/2
k′=1 (r2k′−1− ℓ2k′−1−1)+,
was never selected into C2j−1’s during previous stages 2j−1 < k, and was selected into Ck. Further
simplifying it, we have
E[Mk] =
m∑
i=1

(k+1)/2∏
j=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ Sj | hi ≥ Sj−1]

 ·

(k−1)/2∏
j=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ r2j | hi ≥ ℓ2j − 1]

 ·
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi < rk+1 | hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1]
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Since the MHR condition implies the item is more likely to survive in earlier time steps, we have:
E[Mk] ≥
m∑
i=1

(k+1)/2∏
j=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ r2j−1 − 1 | hi ≥ ℓ2j−1]

 ·

(k−1)/2∏
j=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ r2j | hi ≥ ℓ2j − 1]

 ·
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi < rk+1 | hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1]
=
m∑
i=1

(k+1)/2∏
j=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ ℓ2j − 1 | hi ≥ ℓ2j−1]

 ·

(k−1)/2∏
j=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ l2j+1 | hi ≥ ℓ2j − 1]

 ·
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi < rk+1 | hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1]
=
m∑
i=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[ℓk+1 − 1 ≤ hi < rk+1]
Now,
∑m
i=1Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1] ≥ m2k and
∑m
i=1 Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ rk+1] ≤ m2k+1 . Thus,
E[Mk] ≥
(
m∑
i=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1]
)
−
(
m∑
i=1
Pr
hi∼Hi
[hi ≥ rk+1]
)
≥ m
2k+1
.
Note that m
2k+1
≥ m2s for k < s. For k = s, E[Mk] ≥
∑m
i=1 Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓk+1 − 1] ≥ m2k = m2s . Thus,
E[Mk] ≥ m2s > 5 for any k ≤ s. By Chernoff bound,
Pr
[
Mk ≥ 1
4
· m
2k
]
≥ 1−
(
e−0.5
0.50.5
)5
> 0.535.
Now let pk be F
−1
V
(
max
(
0, 1 − m/2k−1rk−ℓk
))
where FV is the CDF of distribution V , just as in
Algorithm 1. Let the random variable Nk denote the number of buyers with valuation of at least
pk among the next rk − ℓk − 1 buyers. We have
E[Nk] = (rk − ℓk − 1) ·min
(
1,
m/2k−1
rk − ℓk
)
.
If m/2
k−1
rk−ℓk ≥ 1, then pk = −∞ and Nk = rk− ℓk−1 with probability 1. In this case, Algorithm 1
gets at leastmin(Mk, rk−ℓk−1)E[V ] ≥ min
(
Mk,
1
2(rk − ℓk)
)
E[V ] in this stage. SinceMk ≥ 14 ·m2k ≥
1
8 · (rk − ℓk) with probability at least 0.535, we know Algorithm 1 gets at least 0.5354 · (rk − ℓk) ·E[V ]
and thus is an 40.535 < 8-approximation during the stage.
If m/2
k−1
rk−ℓk < 1, then rk − ℓk > 10 and E[Nk] = (rk − ℓk − 1) ·
m/2k−1
rk−ℓk > 0.9 ·
m
2k−1 = 1.8 · m2k > 9.
By Chernoff bound,
Pr
[
Nk ≥ 1
4
· m
2k
]
≥ 1−

 e−(1−
1
4×1.8)(
1
4×1.8
) 1
4×1.8


9
> 0.994.
When min(Nk,Mk) ≥ 14 · m2k , Algorithm 1 gets at least 18 the benchmark during the stage. Therefore,
it is an 80.535·0.994 < 15.1-approximation.
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2.4 Approximating ProShort
In this section, we deal with length-1 stages using Algorithm BlindMatch, that simply matches
each arriving buyer i to any available item.
Theorem 6. Algorithm BlindMatch is a 2.3-approximation to
∑s
k=1 Prok · 1(rk−ℓk=1) = E[V ] ·
|{k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} | rk − ℓk = 1}|.
Proof. Let z = |{k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} | rk − ℓk = 1}|, the number of length-1 stages. Consider the time
t =
⌈
z
2
⌉
. Since there are still at least
⌊
z
2
⌋
length-1 stages after time t, at least 5 ·2⌊ z2⌋ ≥ 5 ·⌈ z2⌉ items
in expectation have horizons of at least t, by the definition of the stages. Using Chernoff bound, the
probability that at least
⌈
z
2
⌉
items with horizons of at least t is greater than 1−
(
e−0.8
0.20.2
)5
> 0.9. If
this happens, the first t items will be matched. Therefore, Algorithm BlindMatch is a 20.9 < 2.3-
approximation to E[V ] · z, completing the proof.
2.5 Approximating ProFinal
We now approximate ProFinal from Lemma 3.
∑m
i=1Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1] ≤ 10 by the definition
of the stages. We run Algorithm 2. We randomly sample an item and focus on the item in our
algorithm. The probability that item i is sampled is proportional to Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1]. If item i is
sampled, we run an algorithm for the single-item setting (lines 3 and 4 in Algorithm 2). The single-
item policy is analyzed in Section 3 where it is shown to achieve welfare at least 12 · ProSinglei.
Algorithm 2: SingleItem
1 For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, set qi ← Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1]
2 i∗ ← item i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with probability qi∑m
i=1 qi
3 Set the reserve price p so that Prv∼V [v ≥ p] = 1E[Hi∗ ]
4 For each arriving buyer, try selling item i∗ with reserve price p
Theorem 7. Algorithm 2 is a 20-approximation of ProFinal in expectation.
Proof. By Theorem 8 and Theorem 9, if item i∗ = i, the algorithm gets 12 · Proi in expectation.
Thus, the expected welfare achieved by algorithm 2 is at least
m∑
i=1
Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1]∑
j Prhj∼Hj [hj ≥ ℓs+1]
· 1
2
· ProSinglei
≥
m∑
i=1
Prhi∼Hi [hi ≥ ℓs+1]
10
· 1
2
·ProSinglei ≥ 1
20
·ProFinal.
2.6 Proof of Theorem 1
Now we are ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. To summarize our previous discussion:
(1) Theorem 5 yields a 15.1-approximation to
∑
k Prok, where the sum is over odd stages k ≤ s
with rk − ℓk ≥ 2.
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(2) If we replace “odd” with “even” in Theorem 5 and the corresponding algorithm, we have a
15.1-approximation
∑
k Prok over even stages k with rk − ℓk ≥ 2.
(3) Theorem 6 is a 2.3-approximation to
∑
k Prok over stages k ≤ s with rk − ℓk = 1.
(4) Theorem 7 yields a 20-approximation to ProFinal.
An algorithm can do one of (1) to (4) with probability 15.152.5 ,
15.1
52.5 ,
2.3
52.5 and
20
52.5 respectively,
yielding a 52.5-approximation to Pro.
3 Prophet Inequality for Single Item with MHR Horizon
In this section, we consider the case where there is m = 1 item, and present a proof of Theo-
rem 2. The algorithm also serves as our approximation for ProSingle, which we use for the overall
algorithm with multiple items
We show that the following fixed-price balancing scheme is a 2-approximation, and this bound
is tight for geometric distributions:
Pretend the item departs uniformly over time at rate 1/µ, where µ = E[H]. Choose a
price p s.t. the rate of acceptance of buyers matches the rate of departure of the item.
We bound the performance of this policy by using a simple linear programming upper bound on
Pro that only uses expected values. Though the relaxation is simple, just as in Section 2.2, it brings
out the key insight that the upper bound also behaves like a balancing scheme, except it assumes
the item lasts forever when performing the matching. Surprisingly, such a simple relaxation yields
the worst-case optimal bound over all MHR distributions.
Theorem 8. Let α = 1− Eh∼H [(1 − µ−1)h]. Then for m = 1 items, there is a fixed pricing policy
that is 1α -competitive. This policy sets the price p such that PrX∼V [X ≥ p] = 1µ where µ = E[H].
Proof. First we find an upper bound for Pro. Let X be a random variable with distribution V .
Consider the following LP:
maximize
∑
v
y(v) · v
subject to
∑
v
y(v) ≤ 1,
y(v) ≤ µ · Pr
X∼V
[X = v], ∀v.
Variable y(v) is the probability that a buyer with realized value v is chosen by prophet. The first
constraint requires the item to be sold at most once in expectation. The second constraint says each
value can be chosen only when it appears. Both of the constraints are relaxations as they should
hold for any realization while the constraints are in expectation. The optimal objective is thus an
upper bound for the expected value of the prophet.
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the first constraint. The partial Lagrangian of
the LP is:
L(λ) = λ+
∑
v
y(v) · (v − λ),
y(v) ≤ µ · Pr
X∼V
[X = v], ∀v.
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The partial Lagrangian is decoupled for each value v and is maximized when y(v) = µ ·
PrX∼V [X = v] for any v ≥ λ and y(v) = 0 otherwise. For any λ, this gives us an upper bound on
the prophet’s welfare. Let p be the value such that PrX∼V [X ≥ p] = 1µ . If we set λ = p, we get the
following upper bound for the prophet’s value:
Pro ≤
∑
v≥p
µ · v ·Pr[X = v] = E
X∼V
[X | X ≥ p].
Essentially, the prophet pretends that the horizon is infinite and it can always find a buyer with
value at least p. Now we look at Alg which is an algorithm with a single price p. The algorithm
has to also consider the event that the horizon ends before the item is matched.
Alg = E
X∼V
[X | X ≥ p] ·Pr[a value at least p was seen during the time horizon]
= E
X∼V
[X | X ≥ p] · E
h∼H
[1− (1− µ−1)h].
Therefore,
Pro
Alg
≤ E
h∼H
[1− (1− µ−1)h]−1.
Now, we show that for MHR horizons, this algorithm is (2− µ−1)-competitive. The key idea is
to use second order stochastic dominance to show that the upper bound is maximized for geometric
distributions with the same mean. Somewhat surprisingly, we also show in Theorem 10 that this
result is tight in the sense that for geometric distributions, no online policy can do better.
Theorem 9. For any MHR distribution with mean µ, Eh∼H [1− (1− µ−1)h]−1 ≤ 2− µ−1.
In order to prove the above theorem, we use second-order stochastic dominance.
Definition 2. Let A and B be two probability distributions on R. Let FA be the cumulative
distribution function of A and FB be the CDF of B. We say A is second-order stochastically
dominant over B if for all x ∈ R, ∫ x
−∞
(FB(t)− FA(t))dt ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. If distribution A is second-order stochastically dominant over B, and A and B
have the same mean, then for any convex function f : R→ R, Ex∼B [f(x)] ≥ Ex∼A[f(x)].
We now use second order stochastic dominance to show the following.
Lemma 4. Geometric distribution with mean µ is second-order stochastically dominated by any
other MHR horizon distribution with the same mean.
Proof. Let φc(x) : N
+ → R be the following convex function:
φc(x) =
{
c− x if x ≤ c
0 if x > c
where c is a positive integer. Let G be the geometric distribution with mean µ. From Definition 2,
the lemma holds if and only if Ex∼D[φc(x)] ≤ Ex∼G[φc(x)] for any c and any MHR distribution D
with the same mean µ.
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We prove this by contradiction. Let D be an MHR distribution with mean µ which satisfies
Ex∼D[φc(x)] > Ex∼G[φc(x)] for some c. The set of MHR distributions with the same tail after
c (the same Prx∼D[x = x∗ | x > c] for any x∗ > c) is homeomorphic to a closed and bounded
set in Rc, which means it’s compact. The function Ex∼D[φc(x)] is continuous in D under L1-
norm, so there is a D = D∗ maximizing Ex∼D[φc(x)] among MHR distributions with the same
tail after c. This D∗ differs from G at some x ≤ c. Define qi = Prx∼D∗[x ≥ i + 1 | x ≥ i] and
q = Prx∼G[x ≥ i + 1 | x ≥ i] = 1 − µ−1. Because D∗ is MHR, qi’s are decreasing. Also q1 > q as
otherwise the mean cannot be µ, and qc < q as otherwise Ex∼D∗ [φc(t)] > Ex∼G[φc(x)] cannot hold.
Thus there is some i∗ < c such that qi∗ > q and qi∗+1 ≤ q.
We are going to show for a pair of small enough ε and ε′, decreasing qi∗ by ε and increasing qi∗+1
by ε′ such that the mean is preserved will increase Et∼D∗ [φc(x)]. Let r = 1 + qi∗+2 + qi∗+2qi∗+3 +
qi∗+2qi∗+3qi∗+4+ · · · . When ε→ 0, we have ε(1+qi+1r) = ε′qir. This implies ε′qi−εqi+1 > 0, which
means Ex∼D∗ [φc(x)] is increased. It contradicts with the fact that D∗ maximizes Ex∼D∗[φc(x)].
Proof. (of Theorem 9) From Theorem 8, we know Pro
Alg
≤ 1/Eh∼H [φ(h)] where φ(h) = 1−(1−µ−1)h
is a concave function. From Lemma 4 and Proposition 1, among all MHR distributions H with
mean µ, Eh∼H [φ(h)] is minimized by a geometric one. For geometric departure with mean µ,
Eh∼H [φ(h)] = 2− µ−1.
Theorem 10. No online algorithm is better than (2 − µ−1)-competitive for m = 1 items when the
horizon distribution H is geometric with mean µ.
Proof. Let q ∈ [0, 1) be the probability that the process continues after each step. We have q =
1− µ−1.
Define Alg* as the expected value of the optimal algorithm and Pro as that of the prophet. Let
the valuation distribution be: vL with probability 1−p and vH with probability p, vL < vH. At each
step, Alg* will set the price to vH if it expects to get more than vL afterwards. Otherwise it will
set the price to vL. Randomizing over vL and vH cannot help Alg*. Also, because the geometric
distribution is memoryless, Alg* will make the same decision every time, i.e., the optimal algorithm
is single-threshold. We have
Alg* = max
{
vL · (1 − p) + vH · p, vH · p
1− q(1− p)
}
and
Pro = vH · p
1− q(1− p) + vL ·
(
1− p
1− q(1− p)
)
.
When µ = 1 and q = 0, the theorem holds because 2 − µ−1 = 1. Otherwise, we set vH so that
Alg* is indifferent between its two options. In that case,
lim
p→0
Pro
Alg*
= lim
p→0
(
1 +
vL
vH
· 1− q(1− p)
p
)
= lim
p→0
(
1 +
(
p
1− q(1− p) − p
)
· 1− q(1− p)
p
)
= 1 + q = 2− µ−1.
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4 Lower Bounds for MHR Horizons (Proof of Theorem 1.5)
Next we provide a proof of Theorem 3. For this, we first show a lower bound of 2 for any dynamic
pricing scheme in the limit when m becomes large, and 1.57 for any finite m. We will subsequently
show that no fixed pricing scheme can extract constant fraction of the welfare for m > 1 items.
For showing these results, we consider a special family of i.i.d. MHR horizon distributions, which
we call low-rate geometric: Let H be a geometric distribution with mean µ, so the probability of
survival at each step is q = 1− µ−1. We call H low-rate geometric when q → 1−. Let λ = 1− q be
the rate of departure for each item. This goes to 0+ when H is low-rate geometric.
Low-rate geometric distributions correspond to the canonical setting where items are long-
lasting, yet their departures are memoryless. In addition to being canonical, the reason we consider
this setting is its analytic tractability: It allows us to ignore events where multiple items depart
simultaneously, leading to tractable Markov chains for both the prophet and the algorithm. The
proof of lower bound of 2 for large m involves analyzing an interesting time-reversed Markov chain
for the prophet’s welfare.
4.1 Tractable Approximation
Denote by Alg∗m(λ) the optimal online policy when there are m items and the rate of departures
is λ. Similarly, we define Prom(λ) to denote the prophet. Since we are considering the limit as
λ→ 0+, we will assume throughout that λ < 1m .
Define the state of the system to be k if there are k items in the system. Note that since
departures are geometric, any online policy will use a fixed price in each state. The state of the
system therefore decreases over time. For both of the processes (corresponding to prophet and the
optimal algorithm) given the current state is k, there is a positive probability that the next state
will be k′ for any k′ ≤ k. However, the probability that multiple items depart together (or a match
and departures happen together for the algorithm) is extremely small when λ → 0+. In light of
this, we introduce alternative processes for the ease of analysis.
In an alternative process, we will assume two events (departures, matches) do not simultaneously
happen. In other words, for the prophet, given state k, the state transitions to k−1 with probability
kλ per time step. We do not consider state changes due to matching. Instead and equivalently, we
will assume that in hindsight, the prophet can optimally match arriving buyers to items that had
not departed by that time. Call this prophet Pro′m(λ). For the algorithm, we assume that if the
state is k, the price is set so that the rate at which a buyer is matched is πk = βkλk. Since items
also depart at rate λk, we will assume the state transitions from k to k − 1 at rate (1 + βk)λk.
Denote the optimal such algorithm as Alg′m(λ).
Lemma 5. (Proved in Appendix A.2) For any m ≥ 1: Prom(λ)
Pro
′
m(λ)
→ 1 and Alg∗m(λ)
Alg
′
m(λ)
→ 1 as λ→ 0
Therefore, we will analyze the quantity cm(λ) =
Pro
′
m(λ)
Alg′m(λ)
as the competitive ratio of the algorithm
against prophet for any m,λ and subsequently take the limit as λ → 0+. In the remainder of this
section, without creating ambiguity we omit the m and λ in notation and use Alg′ and Pro′
instead.
4.2 Lower Bound Construction for Dynamic Pricing
To show the lower bounds, we consider the valuation distribution V such that for any x ∈ [1,∞),
Prv∼V [v ≥ x] = x−α where α ∈ (1,+∞) is a constant that will be determined later. Note that
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Ev∼V [v] is finite. We first give an upper bound for Alg′ for this valuation distribution:
Alg′ ≤
m∑
k=1
max
βk
βkkλ
(1 + βk)kλ
· E[v | v ≥ F−1V (1− βkkλ)]
where FV is the cumulative distribution function for V . The probability of accepting a buyer in
state k is at most βkkλ(1+βk)kλ (because acceptance and departure are disjoint events in the alternative
process). Simplifying it, we have:
Alg′ ≤
m∑
k=1
max
βk
βkkλ
(1 + βk)kλ
· E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ (βkkλ)−
1
α ]
=
m∑
k=1
max
βk
βkkλ
(1 + βk)kλ
· α
α− 1 · (βkkλ)
− 1
α
=
m∑
k=1
(kλ)−
1
α · α
α− 1 ·maxβk
β
1− 1
α
k
1 + βk
.
Optimizing over βk, we have:
Alg′ =
m∑
k=1
(kλ)−
1
α · (α− 1)− 1α . (1)
Now we solve for Pro′. Note that for the prophet, we assume the state only changes due to
departure of items. Let pk(v) denote the probability that the item departing in state k is matched
to a buyer with valuation at least v by the prophet. In the rest of this section, we call the item
departing at state k to be item k. We have:
Pro′ =
m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
pk(v)dv. (2)
We now present different bounds for the above quantity depending on whether m is finite, or
we are considering the limit m→∞.
4.2.1 Lower Bound for Dynamic Pricing: Finite m
This bound is simpler. Clearly, if a buyer with value at least v arrives at state k, Pro′ always can
assign the item k to a buyer with value at least v. Therefore,
Pro′ ≥
m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
Pr[some buyer with valuation at least v arrives in state k]dv
=
m∑
k=1
(
1 +
∫ +∞
1
(1− kλ)v−α
v−α + kλ− kλv−αdv
)
.
Therefore, we have:
lim inf
λ→0+
Pro′
Alg′
≥ lim
λ→0+
∫ +∞
1
1
1+kλvαdv
(kλ)−
1
α (α− 1)−1/α
=
∫ +∞
0
1
1+uαdu
(α− 1)−1/α
=
1
α · B( 1α , 1− 1α)
(α− 1)−1/α =
π
α/ sin(
π
α)
(α− 1)−1/α ,
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where B(·, ·) is the beta function. Comparing to Equation (1), we have that lim infλ→0+ Pro
′
Alg′ is
maximized at α = 2 and in that case,
Pro′
Alg′
≥ π/2 ≈ 1.5708.
The bound holds for any m ∈ N+.
4.2.2 Lower Bound for Dynamic Pricing: Large m
We now consider the more interesting case when m → ∞. We present a tighter lower bound for
Equation (2). To achieve this goal, we need to to analyze pk(v) more carefully. Previously, we used
the fact that if a buyer with value at least v arrives during state k, then a buyer with value at least
v will be assigned to the item k by the prophet. However, the prophet might assign a buyer with
value at least v to item k even if no such buyer arrives in state k.
It is easy to see that the optimal policy for the prophet is the following: It considers the items in
increasing order of realized horizon, and matches each item to the highest valued unmatched buyer
arriving no later than the horizon of the item. A buyer with value at least v is matched to the item
k if and only if there is an i ≥ 0 such that between beginning of the state k+ i and end of state k, at
least i+1 buyers with value at least v arrive. Note that in the previous section, we only considered
the case of i = 0 to give a lower bound for pk(v).
Time-reversed Markov Chain. In order to analyze the new process, we start from the end of
state k and go back in time. There are two possible types of events:
• An item departs, so that the state increases by 1 (note we are going back in time); or
• A buyer with valuation at least v arrives.
We maintain a counter q initially set to 1. Each time an item departs, we increase q by 1, and
each time a buyer with valuation at least v arrives, we decrease q by 1. It is easy to see that the
item k is matched to a buyer with valuation at least v by the prophet if and only if q reaches 0, i.e.,
pk(v) = Pr[q = 0 at some time].
Note that as we are going back in time, when the state is k + j − 1, the probability an item
departs is (k+ j)λ. Similarly, the probability a buyer with valuation at least v arrives is v−α. This
yields a Markov chain in which when the state is the (k+ j, q), the former event causes the state to
become (k + j + 1, q + 1) and the latter causes the state to become (k + j, q − 1).
As pk(v)’s themselves are hard to analyze, we approximate them by a sequence of functions
{fj(x)}∞j=0. Each fj(x) is defined on [0, 1], and it represents the probability that the following
random walk ever reaches 0 in j steps: A point starts at 1 on the number line. Independently
in each step, it goes left by 1 with probability x, and goes right by 1 otherwise. Note that as
j → ∞, fj(x) → min
(
1, x1−x
)
. That is, the point-wise limit of {fj(x)}∞j=1 as j → ∞ is f(x) =
min(1, x/(1 − x)). (We slightly abuse notation at x = 1 and f(1) = 1.)
Lemma 6. pk(v) ≥ fj(v−α/(v−α + (k + j)λ)) for any integer j ∈ [1,m− k].
Proof. From state k to state k + j, exactly j departures happen so the process for pk(v) has at
least j moves in this period. For each move, the probability that the counter q decreases is at least
v−α/(v−α+(k+ j)λ). Therefore, we can couple these two processes so that if the random walk ever
reaches 0, the counter must have visited 0 too.
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We now show that these functions uniformly converge.
Lemma 7. {log fj(x)}∞j=1 uniformly converges to log f(x) on (0, 1]. This implies ∀ε > 0,∃k,∀j >
k,∀x, fj(x) > (1− ε)f(x).
Proof. Notice fj(x) is continuous on x and increasing in j. For any c > 0, on the compact set [c, 1],
each log fj(x) is continuous in x, and their limit log f(x) is continuous too. Further, log fj(x) is
increasing in j. By Dini’s theorem, the convergence on [c, 1] is uniform.
For any ε > 0, for any x ∈ (0, ε) and any j ≥ 1, fj(x) ≥ x > x1−x · (1−ε) = (1−ε)f(x). Because
{log fj(x)}∞j=1 uniformly converges on [ε, 1], there is a k so that for any j > k and any x ∈ [ε, 1],
fj(x) > (1− ε)f(x). This completes the proof.
Now we are ready to explicitly compute a lower bound for Pro′ as m → ∞. We start with
Equation (2).
Pro′ =
m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
pk(v)dv
≥
m−√m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
pk(v)dv
≥
m−√m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
f√m(v
−α/(v−α + (k +
√
m)λ))dv
where the final inequality follows from Lemma 6.
Let ck = infx∈(0,1] fk(x)/f(x). Then we have:
Pro′ ≥ c√m
m−√m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
f(v−α/(v−α + (k +
√
m)λ))dv
= c√m
m−√m∑
k=1
∫ +∞
0
min(1, v−α/((k +
√
m)λ))dv
= c√m
m∑
k=
√
m
∫ +∞
0
min(1, v−α/(kλ))dv
= c√m
m∑
k=
√
m
(
(kλ)−
1
α +
∫ +∞
(kλ)−
1
α
v−α/(kλ)dv
)
= c√m
m∑
k=
√
m
α
α− 1 · (kλ)
− 1
α .
When m→∞, c√m goes to 1 by Lemma 7, and
∑m
k=
√
m k
− 1α
∑m
k=1 k
− 1α
goes to 1 too. Thus,
lim inf
m→∞
(
lim inf
λ→0+
Pro′∑m
k=1
α
α−1 · (kλ)−
1
α
)
≥ 1.
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Together with the bound for Alg′ from Equation (1), this gives us:
lim inf
m→∞
(
lim inf
λ→0+
Pro′
Alg′
)
≥
α
α−1
(α− 1)− 1α
,
which reaches its maximum of 2 at α = 2. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
4.3 Lower Bound for Fixed Pricing Schemes
A natural question is whether there is a single-threshold algorithm that is a constant approximation.
Note that this is indeed the case when the horizons Hi’s are identical and deterministic; in fact,
in this case, the competitive ratio approaches 1 as m → ∞. In contrast, when the horizons are
not deterministic — even if they are i.i.d geometric, we show that no fixed pricing scheme can be
constant-competitive. This shows the second part of Theorem 3.
Theorem 11. There exists a family of instances with i.i.d geometric horizons, such that any fixed
pricing algorithm is Ω(log logm)-competitive, where m is the number of items.
Proof. For any m ≥ 25 such that log2m is an integer, consider a geometric horizon distribution
H whose mean is m: Let qm be the probability that the horizon is greater than the mean, i.e.
qm = Prh∼H [h > m]. It is easy to verify 14 ≤ qm ≤ 1e since H is geometric. Let the value
distribution V satisfy: supp(V ) = {1/(qtmt2) | t = 3, 4, . . . , log2m} and Prv∼V [v ≥ 1/(qtmt2)] = qtm
for t = 3, 4, . . . , log2m. Straightforward calculation shows
E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ 1/(qtmt2)] = Θ(1) ·
1
qtm
·
log2 m∑
k=t
qkm ·
1
qkmk
2
= Θ(1) · 1
qtm
·
(
1
t
− 1
(log2m) + 1
)
.
Without loss of generality, for any single-threshold algorithm Sing, assume the threshold is 1/(qtmt
2).
We know in time interval [jm + 1, (j + 1)m], the expected number of transactions is at most the
minimum of the expected number of buyers with valuations at least 1/(qtmt
2), and the expected
number of items alive at the start of the interval. Therefore,
Sing ≤ E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ 1/(qtmt2)] ·
∞∑
j=0
min(mqtm,mq
j
m)
≤ m · E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ 1/(qtmt2)] · (t+ 1)qtm/(1 − qm) = O(m).
We know from previous discussion that the upper bound from Lemma 2 is at most 53 · Pro.
Previously, we set the stages so that about 12 of items depart in each stage. The factor of
1
2 is not
essential and we can change it to any constant strictly between 0 and 1, e.g. qm. Doing this only
costs us a constant.
If we set the reserve price in the interval [jm+ 1, (j + 1)m] to be qjmj2, we have:
Pro = Ω(1) ·m ·
(log2 m)−5∑
j=3
qjm · E
v∼V
[v | v ≥ 1/(qjmj2)]
= Ω(1) ·m ·
(log2 m)−5∑
j=3
1/j = Ω(m log logm).
Therefore, Pro = Ω(log logm) · Sing for the constructed family of instances.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the setting when items have stochastic horizons. We show a constant-
approximation against the prophet when the horizons satisfy the MHR condition. Unlike the classic
multi-choice prophet inequalities where the approximation ratio goes to 1 when the number of
items becomes large, we show a 1.57 (improves to 2 when the number of items becomes large)
approximation lower bound even when the horizons are i.i.d. geometric. Our constant is tight for
the single-item setting.
We now list several open questions. First, our constant factor for the upper bound (53) in the
multi-item setting does not match the lower bound (2). Closing the gap would be interesting as a
future direction. Next, is it possible to have stochastic horizons in more general prophet-inequality
settings such as [10]? Finally, it would be interesting to extend our work to the case where items
arrive and depart in a stochastic fashion.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Lower Bound for non-MHR Horizons (Proof of Theorem 4)
We assume m = 1 in this proof. The same ideas apply to any m ≥ 1. Without loss of generality,
assume n = 2ck for c that will be fixed later. The horizon is 2ci with probability 2−i−1 for i =
0, 1, 2, . . . , k− 1, and is n with probability 2−k. Intuitively, there are k+1 possible horizons, where
each one is exponentially longer, yet exponentially less probable than the previous one. Denote the
valuation distribution by: a1 with probability p1, a2 with probability p2, . . . , am with probability
pm where a1 < a2 < · · · < am. Here we set m = ck, ai = 2i/c and pi = 2−i except pck = 2−ck+1.
Let VPro be any policy that knows realized valuations but not realized horizon, and Pro be
the omniscient prophet. The only information VPro does not know beforehand is the realized
horizon, and during execution it cannot do anything once the horizon ends. Therefore it should aim
for a specific buyer in advance:
VPro = E
v1,...,vn

max
i

∑
j≥i
πj

Mi(v1, . . . , vn)


≤ 2 E
v1,...,vn
[
max
i
πiMi(v1, . . . , vn)
]
,
where πi is the probability for the horizon to be 2
ci and Mi(v1, . . . , vn) is the maximum of the first
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2ci values. Then we have
VPro ≤ 4 ·
k∑
i=0
2i Pr
v1,...,vn
[∃j, πjMj ≥ 2i]
≤ 4
k∑
i=0
2imin

1,∑
j
Pr
v1,...,vn
[πjMj ≥ 2i]


≤ 4
k∑
i=0
2imin

1,∑
j
2cj Pr
v1,...,vn
[2−jv1 ≥ 2i]


≤ 4
k∑
i=0
2imin

1, 2∑
j
2cj2−ci−cj


≤ 4
k∑
i=0
2imin
(
1, 2(k + 1)2−ci
)
= O(1)
when k = 2c. Here the first inequality is an approximation of the Lebesgue integral of VPro. The
second and third inequalities are union bounds.
On the other hand, we have
Pro ≥ 1
2
·
k∑
i=0
2i
k∑
j=0
πj · Pr
v1,...,vn
[Mj ≥ 2i]
≥ 1
2
·
k∑
i=0
2i
k∑
j=0
2−j ·min
(
(1− e−1), (1 − e−1)2cj · Pr
v1,...,vn
[v1 ≥ 2i]
)
≥ 1
2
·
k∑
i=0
2i
k∑
j=0
2−j ·min ((1− e−1), (1 − e−1)2cj−ci)
≥ 1
2
·
k∑
i=0
2i2−i ·min ((1− e−1), (1 − e−1)2ci−ci) = Ω(k).
Here the first inequality is an approximation of the Lebesgue integral of Pro. The second inequality
uses the fact that: if sum of the probabilities of several independent events is p ≤ 1, then the union of
them happens with probability at least (1−e−1)·p. As n = 2ck = 2k log2 k, we know k = Θ
(
logn
log logn
)
.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
We only show that Prom(λ)
Pro′m(λ)
→ 1. The proof of the second part that Alg∗m(λ)
Alg′m(λ)
→ 1 uses a similar
argument. We consider the following two processes: the main process based on the actual departure
of items in which two departures might happen simultaneously and the alternative process in which
at each time step at most one item can depart. The alternative process might modify the number
of items in the system at some point during the process with a very small probability. In that case,
states of the two processes differ at some point and the two corresponding prophets might achieve
different values. Otherwise, they are always at the same state during the process and their values
are exactly the same.
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There exist two sources of differences (only consider the first time step that they are not at the
same state during the process). The first one which we call type 1 is as follows: If two departures
happen at the same time, alternative process will only consider one of them. In other words, if the
main process goes from state k to k′ such that k′ < k − 1, the alternative process will go from k to
k−1 and will assume there are still k−1 items in the system at the next time step. The probability
of such a difference for a state k is not more than 2
k(1−q)2
kqk−1(1−q) which goes to 0 as q approaches 1.
Therefore, using the union bound and the fact that m is finite, the probability of such a difference
during the process at some state k denoted by p1 also approaches 0.
The second source of differences (type 2) is: If the current state of the main process is k and
it remains unchanged after a time step (no departures happens) with a very small probability
( q
k−1+k(1−q)
qk
), the state of the alternative process will change to state k − 1 at this time step. The
probability of such a difference at state k is q
k−1+k(1−q)
k(1−q)qk−1 . We can see that this probability goes to 0
as q approaches 1 and since m is finite, using the union bound, the probability of such a difference
during the process denoted by p2 goes to 0 as q approaches 1.
Note that the value of Pro′ (alternative prophet) can only be greater than Pro (main prophet) if
two departures happen at the same time step during the actual departure process (type 1 difference).
However, note that the conditional expectation of Pro′ given that such a difference exists is not
greater than Pro′ (the expected welfare of Pro′). Therefore, we have:
Pro ≥ (1− p1)Pro′.
In addition, Pro can be only greater then Pro′ if a type 2 difference exists. Similarly, the conditional
expectation of Pro given that a type 2 difference exists is not greater than Pro. Therefore, we
also have:
Pro′ ≥ (1− p2)Pro.
Using the last two inequalities,
1− p1 ≤ Pro
Pro′
≤ 1
1− p2 .
Using that p1 and p2 both go to 0, we have
Pro
Pro
′ → 1.
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